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Trade Potential and UN Peacekeeping Participation
Shenghao Zhang
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
ABSTRACT
The determinants of a country’s UN peacekeeping troop contribution have been
persistently studied. Trade, as a crucial self-interest motivation, is one of the
important explanatory variables in the extant literature. However, the existing
literature presents mixed results on the influence of trade on peacekeeping
troop contributions. To capture the effect of trade on contributions precisely,
we need to model expectations about future trade volume in a better way.
Countries are pressured by the economic and political risks caused by the
trade disruption and lobby groups to send peacekeeping troops to enable
future trade or secure future investments. Therefore, trade potential, rather
than realized trade, drives peacekeeping troop contributions. A gravity model
is used to measure the trade potential between the UN peacekeeping mission
countries and contributors, and test its relationship with the UN peacekeeping
participation. Based on this measurement and a dyadic troop contribution
dataset covering the period from 1990 to 2012, this article demonstrates that
the counter-factual predictive trade volume is a relevant predictor of UN
peacekeeping troop contributions.
KEYWORDS Trade potential; UN peacekeeping; gravity model
1. Introduction
Peacekeeping is an important conflict resolution tool. In the light of its
importance, there is a question to be raised: what determines peacekeeping
troop contributions? Scholars give different answers to this question.
Trade is one of the important explanatory variables of this question for it
is a crucial self-interest motivation. However, the existing literature finds
mixed results about the trade’s influence on peacekeeping troop contri-
bution.1 Different papers examine the relationship in different ways. Rost
and Greig2 examine the non-UN peacekeeping operations and find that
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trade interest can explain the peacekeeping contributions while Perkins and
Neumayer find that there is no association between trade ties and peacekeep-
ing contributions if examining both UN peacekeeping and non-UN peace-
keeping operations. Following examining peacekeeping contributions,
Stojek and Tir utilize UN Security Council’s five permanent members’ (P5
countries) trade volumes with UN peacekeeping host countries to test
trade’s influence on peacekeeping participation. They argue that country’s
contribution is secondary to the mission authorization and therefore, the
UN peacekeeping participation is influenced by the key states’ trade interests,
i.e. P5 countries’ interest rather than all countries’ trade interest. However, it
is possible that individual country’s trade interest still matters. It could be the
reason that the actual trade volume itself may not be a good indicator of a
country’s trade interest, given that Stojek and Tir regard the realized trade
volume as the forward-looking trade opportunity.
I argue that trade potential is a better indicator to show a country’s trade
interest in peacekeeping host countries when trade ties are disrupted by
wars. Trade potential estimates the extra trade volume, which is the trade
volume additional to the realized or actual trade volume. Not only P5
countries but many countries are potentially concerned about the disrupted
trade influences the domestic economy and prefer to protect their estab-
lished trade linkages and investments in mission countries. The objective
of peacekeeping is to restore peace which may allow for future trade; in
other words, trade potential of peace rather than realized trade under
conflict should motivate peacekeeping contributions. Furthermore, this
paper links the concept of trade potentials from the field of the economic
integration with peacekeeping studies. It bridges the economic literature
via using the concept of trade potential in conflict studies and
helps conflict literature adding a new variable to explain the motivation
of peacekeeping contribution.
In the next section, I review the literature on what determines peace-
keeping contributions, in the process of which I pinpoint the position of
economic motivations in peacekeeping contributions literature. Then, I
narrow it down to the relationship between trade ties and peacekeeping
contributions. I show how scholars use different ways to examine the
trade’s influence on peacekeeping participation. I argue that trade potential
is a better indicator of peacekeeping contributors’ private interest and
present my theoretical mechanism linking trade potential and peacekeep-
ing contributions. Next, I present my research design and discuss my
empirical result. I introduce how to use the gravity model to measure
trade potentials and use logistic regression to run the main model.
Finally, I conclude that trade potentials influence UN peacekeeping
participation.
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2. Peacekeeping Motivations and Peacekeeping Contribution
Earlier scholars claim that the peacekeeping contribution can be regarded as
an impure public goods3 or a ‘joint product model’.4 Peacekeeping oper-
ations include both public benefits, i.e. world peace, which is accessible to
any country, and private benefits, such as financial reimbursements. In
other words, in the process of providing public goods, the providers gain
various benefits. Otherwise, if the provider does not receive any private
benefit, peacekeeping contribution will be under-provided or even not be
provided.5 Therefore, several studies have focused on the private benefits
and distinguish different kinds of private benefits, which can be generally
classified into three categories: political benefits, economic benefits and nor-
mative benefits.
From the perspective of political benefits, countries send peacekeeping for
regional security concerns,6 coup-proofing,7 maintaining political or foreign
policy affinity,8 stabilizing former colonial ties9 and stemming refugee
flows.10 Normatively speaking, some countries send peacekeeping troops
for winning a ‘good citizen’ reputation.11 Then, there are economic motiv-
ations including financial reimbursements,12 getting foreign aid from
‘pivotal states’, i.e. developed countries13 and trade interests.14
Even though trade interest, as one type of economic benefits, is intuitive in
explaining the motivation of peacekeeping troop contributions, the literature
present mixed results. In previous research, Rost and Greig15 found a statisti-
cally significant relationship in state-conducted peacekeeping operations
while Perkins and Neumayer16 who examine both UN peacekeepings and
non-UN peacekeeping operations find no association. Following upon
Perkins and Neumayer, Stojek and Tir17 examine the scope of UN peace-
keeping operations, and respond to Perkins’ no association result. Given
that Perkins and Neumayer’s paper finds no association, Stojek and Tir
3Bobrow and Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability.”
4Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, “The Demand for UN Peacekeeping.”
5Boutton and D’Orazio, “Buying Blue Helmets.”
6Bove and Elia, “Supplying Peace”; Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict
Spaces.”
7Kathman and Melin, “Who Keeps the Peace?”; Lundgren, “Backdoor Peacekeeping.”
8Ward and Dorussen, “Standing Alongside Your Friends.”
9Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces.”
10Uzonyi, “Refugee Flows and State Contributions.”
11Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping.”
12Bobrow and Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability”; Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions to UN
and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions.”
13Boutton and D’Orazio, “Buying Blue Helmets.”
14Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces”; Stojek and Tir, “The Supply
Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”; Rost and Greig, “Taking Matters into Their Own
Hands”; Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions.”
15Rost and Greig, “Taking Matters into Their Own Hands.”
16Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces.”
17Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
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only test P5 countries’ trade volumes and peacekeeping contributions, and
regards peacekeeping contribution from the perspective of the UN insti-
tution rather than individual countries. Gaibulloev et al.18 mentions trade
as an explanatory factor in peacekeeping personnel contributions.19 Their
paper uses per capita GDP to measure contributing countries’ well-being
for the richer a country is, the more loss (including trade loss) will be
incurred. Also, the paper uses a monadic measurement, trade openness
(trade/GDP), to examine its influence on peacekeeping contributions. As
their paper argues, trade openness does not positively affect the supply of
peacekeepers for industrial countries may not do business in the conflict
areas such as Africa.
Careful reading reveals that there is a subtle but significant distinction
between Perkins and Neumayer’s and Stojek and Tir’s theoretical arguments.
Perkins and Neumayer use bilateral trade volumes in a dyadic method to
examine whether trade is related to an individual country’s peacekeeping
contribution. In contrast, Stojek and Tir20 think that no association
between trade volumes and peacekeeping contributions because Perkins
and Neumayer21 examine all countries’ willingness. Stojek and Tir switch
to examine major UN decision makers’ contribution willingness for they
argue that country’s contribution is secondary to the mission authorization
and therefore, the UN peacekeeping participation is influenced by the key
states’ trade interest (P5 countries) rather than all countries’ trade interest.
Peacekeeping participation in their paper means the UN authorization,
which is from the perspective of the UN institution. In short, voluntary
sending troops by a country is different from the UN’s authorization and
then participation.
However, the changed strategy shows that scholars still believe that trade
ties should hold an explanatory power in peacekeeping contributions. After
all, the trade is an important part in private economic benefits and countries
will protect it. Setting aside the literature of peacekeeping operations, trade
has been regarded as a valid motivation in third party military intervention
and etc. Kathman22 argues that the potential conflict spillover risk increase
the likelihood of the intervention of neighbouring countries with strong
trade interests in order to contain the violence. Bove et al.23 investigate
what the relationship of bilateral trade flows between the United States
and the rest of the world and US military presence. Bove et al.24 find that
18Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions.”
19They regard trade interest as a part of a country’s private benefits and as a proxy for trade interests.
20Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
21Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces.”
22Kathman, “Civil War diffusion.”
23Bove, Elia, and Sekeris, “US Security Strategy.”
24Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris, “ ‘Oil Above Water’ Economic.”
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countries at war with higher bilateral trade in oil and gas are more likely to
attract the external intervention.
However, here in peacekeeping studies, given that the influence of the
trade is mixed, I question whether actual trade itself is able to capture a coun-
try’s private trade interests properly. I thus propose an alternative method,
i.e. trade potential to model trade benefits.
3. Reconsider the Mechanism: Trade Potentials and
Peacekeeping Contribution
Stojek and Tir25 explicitly and carefully lay out a causal path from trade to
participation in peacekeeping missions. Their causal path can be summar-
ized in this way: both interstate wars and intrastate wars influence inter-
national trade.26 The interrupted international trade can have a powerful
effect on domestic politics as it diminishes economic growth and job cre-
ation.27 Then, the affected growth and employment can influence the incum-
bent office holding.28 In order to lower the affected risk, countries will
contribute troops in peacekeeping operations for post-civil war stability of
mission host countries, considered as the vehicle of future trade and econ-
omic growth, can be regarded as in a contributors’ interest.29
Specifically, Stojek and Tir30 argue that ‘P5 countries and their trade-
oriented domestic constituencies are more motivated by future profit-
making opportunities than by undoing past losses’ in order to seek faster
profits from their investment. Their empirical result shows that the past
trade loss, which is measured by the difference between trade volumes
prior to the civil war onset and trade volumes prior to the ceasefire, actually
dissuades the UN peacekeeping participation. Following on Srojek and Tir’s
path, I argue that trade potential influences the UN peacekeeping partici-
pation. Trade potential means that there exists the extra volume that a
country could have achieved, if there were no wars. It is a perceived or pre-
dicted concept.
Before arguing trade potential’s influence, two limitations on Stojek and
Tir’s trade argument should be noted. Stojek and Tir31 argue that P5
countries, as they economically powerful, can already establish high trade
volume ties with peacekeeping host countries, which shows both the trade
25Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
26Bayer and Rupert, “Effects of Civil Wars”; Anderton and Carter, “The Impact of War on Trade.”
27Rogowski, “Political Cleavages”; Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations.”
28Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes”; MacKuen, “Political
Drama.”
29Kassebaum and Hamilton, “Peacekeeping and the US National Interest.”
30Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
31Ibid.
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promise (for the past trade can be regarded as a promise for the future trade)
and material evidence (for the high volume trade is already showed with the
actual trade). First, it is questionable to use the realized/current trade prior to
the civil war to represent the trade opportunity. The war may have lasted
already a long time and that trade volume could be outdated as trade oppor-
tunity. Second, many non-P5 countries may currently not have as high as P5
countries’ trade volumes but they also have trade interest in peacekeeping
host countries. They may expect that they could have more extensive trade
links in the future after the war has ended. Non-P5 countries can also
have trade opportunity or promise in the future and are inclined to contrib-
ute troops, but this trade future expectation is not necessarily captured by the
current/realized trade volume. I argue that counterfactual trade volume can
be represented by trade potentials.
Trade potential means that the extra trade volume a country could have
achieved if there were no wars (perceived/predicted trade). Compared
with the Stojek and Tir’s method that using the trade volume before the
wars shows the trade opportunity/promise, trade potential can be dynami-
cally estimated each year after the war breaks out. In other words, trade
potential is regarding a counter-factual concept.
Furthermore, the elasticity of demand and supply32 and asset specificity33
or factor mobility34 is relevant to estimate the existence of trade potential.
Countries and lobby groups or traders have their trade expectation even
though there is a war. Firms are profit-maximizing and they estimate the
conflict-associated risks and internalized the related transaction costs,
which reduce trades even before conflicts’ occurrence.35 However, the
reduced trade links does not mean that there is no demand or supply
from the peacekeeping senders. Therefore, trade is elastic and countries
are endeavouring to protect the shrunk trade interest, to remedy it and if
possible to expand it. In other words, traders will have ex ante expectations,
which are trade potentials. Countries then send peacekeeping troops. Also,
regarding factor mobility and asset specificity, traders, i.e. peacekeeping
senders do not want to spend money to find an alternative market for they
have already invested in peacekeeping host countries with specific assets.
Especially, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as an important private
benefits in the peacekeeping contribution,36 can be incorporated in the
trade interest. The FDI are considered by investors in a long time term for
factories and infrastructures do not easily translate into liquid asset.37 As
32Reuveny, “ The Trade and Conflict Debate”; Li and Sacko, “The (Ir) Relevance of Militarized.”
33Williamson, The Mechanism of Governance; Li, “Foreign Direct Investment.”
34Hirschman, National Power.
35Li and Sacko, “The (Ir) Relevance of Militarized.”
36Gaibulloev et al., “Personnel Contributions to UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions.”
37Li, “Foreign Direct Investment.”
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long as the infrastructure is still workable, it represents trade potential for it
is much easier to re-invest in an extant country. Therefore, I argue that this
future trade expectation means the perceived future trade opportunities,
which can be represented by the predicted trade volume and further rep-
resented by the trade potentials, i.e.:
Trade potential = Predicted trade volume − Actual/Existing trade volume
Arguably, trade potential presents a powerful motivation to send peace-
keepers. Sending peacekeeping troops may not necessarily guarantee that
the trade ties can be quickly remedied with the pre-war increasing trade
speed but the deterrence effect of peacekeeping troops38 may reduce the
possible damage caused by the civil war. Therefore, countries will contribute
troops to attain peace and to maintain it post-conflict.
Then why do countries choose UN peacekeeping rather than other
forms of third party intervention? Stojek and Tir already argue that UN
peacekeeping is a more cost-economical, legitimate and effective tool
than a unilateral action. Firstly, the cost of UN peacekeeping operations
is shared by UN members. Even though Rost and Greig argue that
countries can contribute to a state-conducted peacekeeping, they also
admit that peacekeeping is costly. Given that the financial burden shared
by other UN members, the expenditure of peacekeeping operations is
much cheaper than the cost of state-conducted peacekeeping operations.39
Not only costly in manpower and resources, the UN peacekeeping oper-
ation is a better choice for countries in terms of reputation and audience
costs.40 Participating in UN peacekeeping operations reduces the risk of
unpopular results while statesmen at least echo the interest group’s
demand. Also, participation in UN peacekeeping can be a legitimate and
noble symbol,41 reducing the voices of opposition.
In short, based on Stojek and Tir’s causal mechanism, I suggest dis-
tinguishing realized/current trade, and trade potential. Whereas trade have
been examined as predictors of peacekeeping operations and found to
affect P5 behaviour but not that of smaller contributor countries. I focus
on trade potential. Besides, trade potentials can be measured in a time-
dynamic-variation way, which can help to examine the continuation of a
mission’s troop contribution.
An argument summarized in hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: The higher trade potential between peacekeeping contributing
countries and mission host countries, the higher probability that UN peace-
keeping troops will be sent by contributing countries.
38Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”; Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”





This paper focuses on trade potentials’ influence on countries’ UN peace-
keeping contributions, which is the main model. I first introduce the
gravity model to calculate predicted trade volume. Then, trade potentials
are calculated via deducting actual trade volumes from predicted trade
volumes. Finally, I insert trade potential into a model of UN peacekeeping
contributions, and run the main model is by using the calculated trade
potentials in step one. Before the two steps, the current literature regarding
trade potentials and the gravity model are presented initially.
4.1. Trade Potentials and the Gravity Model
The gravity model is a widely used method to forecast international trade
volumes in economics. Derived from and similar to Newton’s physical prin-
ciple of mutual attraction of two masses, the gravity model in economics
gains an empirical success in predicting countries’ trade flows. Many articles
associate the gravity model with the liberal peace theory.
As Kabir et al.42 comprehensively summarize, the gravity model can be
broadly classified into three topics: generalized gravity model,43 gravity
model used in intra-industry trade,44 and gravity mode used in homo-
geneous and heterogeneous product.45 The focus here is on the generalized
gravity model rather than the other two topics. Gravity model articles associ-
ated with conflict studies46 usually discuss liberal peace theory, i.e. the
relationship between trade and the probability of the war. The main
reason scholars47 bring up gravity model components in conflict studies is
that they question whether trade flow can model well in the liberal peace
theory. The gravity model suggests different social interactions may
influence both trade and conflict. Gravity model is not usually used to calcu-
late trade potentials and barely used in the peacekeeping research
community.
Therefore, I use the gravity model to calculate trade potentials and focus on
the basic components of gravity model including population, GDP and dis-
tance. In modelling international trades via the gravity model, the demand
factor of international trades is proportioned with the GDP, and the supply
42Kabir, Salim, and Al-Mawali, “The Gravity Model and Trade Flows.”
43Anderson, “A Theoretical Foundation”; Anderson and Van Wincoop, “Gravity with Gravitas”; Deardorff,
“Determinants of Bilateral Trade.”
44Bergstrand, “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model.”
45Feenstra, “Integration of Trade.”
46Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig, “Make Trade Not War?”; Long, “Bilateral Trade in the Shadow”; Keshk,
Pollins, and Reuveny, “Trade Still Follows the Flag”; Hegre, “Trade Dependence or Size Dependence?”;
Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace.”
47Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, “Trade Still Follows the Flag”; Hegre, “Trade Dependence or Size Depen-
dence?”; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace.”
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factor is proportioned with the population. ‘Higher income suggests higher
demand, while higher population suggests greater self-sufficiency .’48 The dis-
tance factor represents the trade costs. In other words, ‘the model believes that
bilateral trade is positively related to incomes of the two trading countries and
negatively related to their geographical distance and the size of their respect-
ive domestic markets’.49 Further clarification of the gravity model in this
article will be mentioned in the following context and it is time to introduce
the concept of trade potential.
The concept of trade potential is often utilized in economics or political
economy. Trade potential is an operationalization to research the integration
of economy. When a country is going to join the international trade system,
the existing in-the-system countries will have the economic expectations of
new countries and then will forecast future trade volumes. For instance, it is
widely studied on Eastern Europe’s economic integration into the European
Union (EU) economy.50 However, to the best of my knowledge, the concept
of trade potential has so far not been used in conflict studies. The trade
potential concept here is used to measure the economic expectation of peace-
keeping senders on host countries. To some extent, peacekeeping host
countries are expected to re-integrate into the non-conflict international
trade system. In other words, conflicts influence host countries’ trades
with other countries. Peacekeeping senders may have an expectation to nor-
malize host countries’ economic relationships, which motivates peacekeep-
ing contribution.
4.2. Step One: Estimate Predicted Trade Volume
To estimate the predicted trade volume, the gravity model will only include
some basic components. T̂ is the predicted trade volume, P the population, G
the GDP, and D means the distance between country i and country j in kilo-
metres.
̂lnTij = bi lnPi + b j lnP j + bi lnGi + b j lnGj − bij lnDij + eij
Imports and exports51 are added up to a number representing total trade
volume. I use the dyadic version of the Correlates of War Project (COW)
Trade dataset. To try to expand the time frame, the relative longer time
frame datasets of GDP52 and population53 are used. I identify the distance
48Wang and Winters, “The Trading Potential.”
49Li and Sacko, “The (Ir) Relevance of Militarized.”
50Wang and Winters, “The Trading Potential”; Hamilton et al., “Opening Up International Trade”; Martí-
nez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann, “Augmented Gravity Model”; Nilsson, “Trade Integration.”
51Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, “Trading Data”; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, “Correlates of War Project.”
52Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade.”
53Banks and Wilson, “Cross-National Time-Series.”
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between two countries via capital distance as in Gleditsch and Ward’s
dataset.54
Several strategies are used on the gravity model in step one. Firstly, I use
the sub-sample, which includes all non-conflict dyads and excludes the in-
conflict dyads to estimate the gravity model coefficients. Secondly, in the
gravity model estimation, the time frame is restricted to the post-
World War II era. Furthermore, step one is a data-driven process and there-
fore, Theil’s U is used to decide which gravity model specification will be
used.
In the first step, all countries can be divided into countries that are in
conflicts and countries that are not in conflicts. We do not want in-
conflict countries included in the gravity model estimation because we
want to estimate counter-factual trade volumes for these in-conflict
countries. In other words, the conflict dyads are not kept in the country
pool in the process of calculating the gravity model coefficients. The
country pool which is used in the first step is a sub-sample of all countries.
Otherwise, it influences the coefficient result. For example, all countries’
trade with South Sudan from 2013 to present will be excluded in gravity
model estimation in the first step because South Sudan experienced a civil
war in 2013. I use the UCDP dyadic version dataset55 to identify which
countries are suffering inter-state or intra-state wars. Then I label belliger-
ents with time ID and delete these countries in the dyadic trade dataset.56
The scope of countries is restricted previously and now the restriction of
the time scope is explained here. From the perspective of the history, many
countries disappeared and became independent, which creates problems of
the country inconsistency. To specify and compare the result more easily,
I use the time frame of the post-World-War II period in the first step
estimation.57
Step one is a data-driven process in which different models, including
dyad-fixed effect, country1-fixed effect, country2-fixed effect 58 and year-
fixed effect are used to calculate the trade potential. Subsequently, I use
Theil’s U value59 to assess the model quality. The understanding of Theil’s
U is that if a country’s trade can be estimated directly by the trade of its
last year (the naïve estimation), there is no point in using the gravity
model to predict the trade volume. The equation of Theil’s U is presented.
54Gleditsch and Ward, “Measuring Space.”
55Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen, “Dyadic Dimensions”; Peterson, “Dyadic Trade.”
56This method is consistent with Luca De Benedictis and Claudio’s trade potential literature. They call this
method as ‘out-of-sample’. I change the wording here to refrain from the confusion with the ‘out-of-
sample’ method in forecasting
57The second step is from 1990 to 2012 due to the data limitation for some control variables.
58country1 and country2 means country fixed effect. The original dataset keep the data in a one-dyad-
once way.
59Bechtel and Leuffen, “Forecasting European Union Politics”; Theil, Applied Economic Forecasting.
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If the predicted trade by the gravity model is better than the naïve estimation,
the value should be smaller than one. If different data-driven processes of the
gravity model are better than naïve estimation (i.e. one year before trade), the








Given that Theil’s U makes a comparison with the naïve estimation, the
gravity model equation should always add another term, that is, the lagged
dependent variable. Theil’sU uses naive estimation as a benchmark. If exam-
ined from another perspective, only if the gravity model equation includes
the lagged trade volume variable (i.e. naïve estimated result), can the
Theil’s U assure that the gravity model terms (population, GDP and dis-
tance) play their role. In order to use Theil’s U to assess the prediction
quality, the predicted trade volume calculated by the gravity model which
includes the lagged actual trade variable is compared with the naïve esti-
mated trade volume.
4.3. Step Two: Main Model
4.3.1. Independent Variable: Trade Potential
Following up step one, to calculate the trade potential, I deduct the predicted
trade volume from the actual trade volume60 Several points should be noted
here.
First, every country receives a trade potential value for every year. It is in
contrast with Stojek and Tir’s method.61 Their method of calculating trade
loss is using trade volumes prior to the civil war onset minus trade
volumes prior to the ceasefire. They use the trade before the civil war directly
represents the trade opportunity. Both trade volumes prior to the civil war
onset and trade volumes prior to the ceasefire are static. Therefore, their
trade and trade loss variables are static. However, trade potential variable
is calculated annually because each year has a predicted trade volume
value and an actual trade volume value. Therefore, trade potential is
dynamic.
Secondly, trade potential may have a negative value.62 Since potential
trade is measured by deducting actual trade from predicted trade volumes
it is possible to have negative trade potential. A positive value of the trade
potentials means that there is a real trade potential in the future, while a
60For a similar approach, see De Benedict and Vicarelli, “Trade Potentials.”
61Stojek and Tir, “The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”
62De Benedictis and Vicarelli, “Trade Potentials.”
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negative value means that there is no trade potential for the actual trade
already ‘has reached its potential level’.63 From the methodological perspec-
tive of ordinary least square estimation (OLS), this is reasonable. A negative
value means that there are data points under the predicted linear line. Even
though negative values can occur, they are not informative and, therefore, I
have decided to code all negative values as zero because it is suggested by the
theory that ‘trade has reached its potential level’.
Thirdly, trade potentials include some extreme values. Usually for trade
and GDP variables, log-transformation is used. In line with previous
studies, I log transform trade potential as the variable includes some
extreme values and its distribution is skewed.
4.3.2. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the UN peacekeeping participation, i.e. participat-
ing in or not. It is a dummy variable rather than a continuous variable for the
theory does not necessarily indicate that the higher the trade potential, the
larger the number of troops that a country will contribute. However, the
result of the dependent variable as a continuous variable (i.e. troop
numbers) is also provided as a comparison purpose in the robustness
check section. Data for the dependent variable is compiled from two datasets:
Kathman’s dataset64 and IPI dataset.65 The original datasets are the number
of peacekeeping troops, including military troops, the UN peacekeeping
police, and observers. The UN peacekeeping participation is coded as one
when at least one person including military troops, the UN peacekeeping
police, and observers, is sent to a UN peacekeeping mission. Otherwise, it
is coded as zero.
Also, token troop contribution can be regarded as an issue in peacekeep-
ing contribution.66 Therefore, another way to code dependent variable is that
I set a cut off point at 20. In other words, if a sender contributes less than 20
personnels in a host country mission, it will not be counted as a participation
and will be coded as 0. This result is also showed in the robustness check
section.
4.3.3. Control Variables
Many other variables can influence the UN peacekeeping participation. To
illustrate it clearly, control variables are elucidated via different perspectives
including the characteristics of conflicts, missions, host countries,
63Ibid.
64Kathman, “United Nations Peacekeeping.”
65Perry and Smith, “Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping”; IPI, “The International
Peace Institute.”
66Coleman, “Token Troop Contributions.”
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peacekeeping senders and the dyadic relationship between host countries
and peacekeeping senders.
Regarding the characteristics of conflicts themselves, conflict intensity can
be counted. A country is likely to contribute the UN peacekeeping troop in
intense conflicts. Conflict intensity is measured with the UCDP dataset of the
battle related death67. In conflict studies, conflict intensity can be a categori-
cal variable and classified into 2 categories (less than 1000 people and more
than 1000 people), while here conflict intensity is a continuous variable
measured with the number of death people.
As for the characteristics of missions, the mission type can influence
peacekeeping participation. Peacekeeping senders may decide to send
troops based on the mission types including observer mission and traditional
mission.68 Many developed countries contribute token troops in peacekeep-
ing missions.69 Token troop strategy means a limited number of troop con-
tribution and is widely used in the UN peacekeeping missions to gain
prestige. The easier way to contribute token troops is via the observer mis-
sions. Even though the dependent variable is not the number of troops,
the code of peacekeeping participation is based on the number of troops
and may be influenced by mission types. The latest measurement of
peacekeeping mission types is updated by Hegre et al. Therefore, the
model controls this variable by classifying missions into two types as
Hegre et al.70
From the perspective of peacekeeping contributors, the model includes
the variables of financial reimbursement, democratic status and other on-
going missions. Firstly, even though financial reimbursement is criticized
by Coleman and Nyblade, financial reimbursement argument is still widely
used in the current peacekeeping contribution literature that countries’
UN peacekeeping participation is for financial profit-making. However,
there is no direct measurement in the current literature but in the way of
military expenditures per soldier.71 Therefore, military expenditures per
solider here is a proxy measurement of financial reimbursement from the
UN and is calculated via the ratio of military expenditures to the number
of military personnel by using the COW dataset of National Material
Capabilities.72 Secondly, democratic countries are more likely to contribute
67Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg, “Organized Violence.” This variable is re-managed and recoded by
the author. I delete some intra-state dyads for some conflicts are not in the control or mandate of UN
peacekeeping missions. For example, FLEC-R and FLEC-FAC are rebels who fight in the enclaves of
Angola, Cabinda, which is not related with UN missions. Therefore, the death toll is not counted
within the conflict intensity.
68Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård, “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing.”
69Coleman, “Token Troop Contributions.”
70Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård, “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing.”
71Ward and Dorussen, “Standing Alongside Your Friends.”
72Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty.”
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peacekeeping troops.73 Therefore, polity democratic score, polity 2 is used to
control. Furthermore, on-going other missions are included in the model.
The variable may constrain peacekeeping contributors’ military ability to
contribute in other peacekeeping missions and the data is used from Ward
and Dorussen’s replication material.74
From the perspective of dyadic relationship, the model incorporates dis-
tance between host countries and peacekeeping contributors, security alli-
ance, colonial ties,75 refugee flows and direct contiguity relationship.
Firstly, the longer the distance between two countries, the less likely a
country send troops. Distance data is used from the minimum capital dis-
tance dataset.76 Secondly, security alliance influences the contribution of
peacekeeping missions.77 Security alliance is proxy measured by defense
pact with a dummy variable.78 The data is from the COW dataset of security
alliance.79 Thirdly, former colonial ties can influence peacekeeping partici-
pation.80 They are coded as dummy variables from the dataset.81 Further-
more, the dyadic refugee flows can influence the peacekeeping
contribution because contributors concern about their regional stability82
and contribute to the host countries to avoid the conflict spill-over
effect.83 Refugee data is from the UNHCR84 database.85 Also, in order to
test whether a country worries a spill-over conflict, the border dummy vari-
able is included for the neighbour country bordered with host countries are
likely to contribute in the UN peacekeeping missions. The COW dataset of
the direct contiguity86 is used to code common borders and changed from
different types of contiguity into a dummy variable.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Gravity Model Coefficient Calculation
As previously mentioned, the sub-sample method and the Theil’sU value are
used to improve and assess the quality of the model prediction. Therefore,
73Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces”; Lebovic, “Uniting for Peace?”
74Ward and Dorussen, “Standing Alongside Your Friends.”
75Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig, “Make Trade Not War?”
76Gleditsch and Ward, “Measuring Space.”
77Lebovic, “Uniting for Peace.”
78Given that the original dataset is used for survival analysis, therefore, many dyads without any security
alliance do not appear in the dataset. These dyads are filled with 0 in this paper’s dataset.
79Gibler and Sarkees, “Measuring Alliances.”
80Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces.”
81Mayer and Zignago, “Notes on CEPII’s Distances Measures.”
82Perkins and Neumayer, “Extra-Territorial Interventions in Conflict Spaces”; Bove and Elia, “Supplying
Peace.”
83Uzonyi, “Refugee Flows.”
84UNHCR, “United Nations High Commissioner.”
85Some dyads are not included in the dataset will be imputed with 0 as no refugees.
86Stinnett et al., “The Correlates of War.”
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only the best performing model’s regression table is presented here.87 The
model is the gravity model with dyad fixed effect and has the lowest value
of the Theil’s U (0.871). The Theil’s U values of other models are presented
in Appendix.
In Table 1, all gravity model factors are statistically significant at 1%
confidence level. The model has a high R square value for it includes
the lagged dependent variable, which is consistent with Hegre et al.’s
result.88
5.2. Step Two: Main Model and Discussion
My dependent variable, the UN peacekeeping participation, is a binary item
for again my theory does not necessarily indicate that the higher the trade
potential, the larger the number of troops that a country will contribute. I
use logit models for step two of the analysis. The standard error is clustered
in a dyadic fashion. Table 2 shows the result of the main model, which is the
main model.
As previously mentioned, the main independent variable is censored
if there are negative values. Trade potential is also taken the natural
log form for there are some positive outliers. The skewness of the dis-
tribution can then be justified. These methods are employed in the
following table. Model 1 is statistically significant at 1% level and in
a positive direction, which shows that there exists a positive relation-
ship between trade potential and the UN peacekeeping participation.
Therefore, the hypothesis one holds. However, given that these
results are from logit models, their coefficients cannot be interpreted
directly. To obtain a substantive understanding of the effect of trade
potential on the UN peacekeeping (PKO) participation, I thus
present the predicted probability of a country contributing over its
trade potential in Figure 1.
The figure above shows the influence of trade potential’s influence on UN
peacekeeping operation participation. When there is no trade potential and
other control variables are held at their mean values, the probability is
around 20%. The probability can achieve upto around 40% when the trade
potential value is at its max value. In other words, when all the other
control variables are held to the mean value, the larger trade potential is,
the more likely a country participates in the UN peacekeeping operations.
87There are different estimate techniques. As I mentioned in the article, step 1 is only for a data-driven
process and therefore, I use the basic version of gravity model with OLS estimator. However, to ensure
the robustness of the result, I include the gravity model with ‘colonial ties, common language and
common border’ variables with OLS estimator Anderson and Van Wincoop, “Gravity with Gravitas.” I
also use Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML) method Santos Silva and Tenreyro,
“The Log of Gravity.” Both step 1 and step 2 results are showed in Appendix
88Hegre, Oneal, and Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace.”
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Num. obs. 14, 892
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05, standard errors are clus-
tered in a dyadic fashion.
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Regarding control variables, some are consistent with the existing literature
while others are not. The capital distance, colonial ties and democratic
country status are in the expected direction.89 The capital distance shows a nega-
tive relationship with a country’s peacekeeping participation, while colonial ties
between senders and host countries show a positive relationship and democratic
countries are also more likely to participate in the peacekeeping operations.
Even though the financial reimbursement is a popular and important argument
in explaining the UN peacekeeping contribution, Model 1 is in line with
Coleman and Nyblade’s90 findings that the financial reimbursement is not a
valid explanation. The number of concurrent missions variable is in a
different expected direction but consistent with the literature’s finding,91
which shows that countries have a general willingness in contributing the UN
peacekeeping troops. Furthermore, PKO mandate tells the same story with
the number of concurrent missions. It shows that countries are likely to contrib-
ute in traditional missions compared with observer missions. However, after
using trade potential variable, some other variables are inconsistent with the lit-
erature or lose their significance. Conflict intensity loses the significance, which
is inconsistent with the literature92 and does not show that conflict intensity
Figure 1. Effect of trade potential on UN peacekeeping participation.
89Ward and Dorussen, “Standing Alongside Your Friends”.
90Coleman and Nyblade, “Peacekeeping for Profit?”
91Ward and Dorussen, “Standing Alongside Your Friends.”
92Bove and Elia, “Supplying Peace.”
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makes a country more likely to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. The
variable of border country shows a negative relationship, which does not show
that a neighbour country worries about the spill-over conflict. Refugee flows
variable shows an opposite direction compared with the literature.93
6. Robustness Checks
6.1. Cut-off Binary and Continuous Dependent Variable
Some argues that token troop contribution can be regarded as an issue in
peacekeeping contribution. Therefore, in Model 2, the dependent variable
is recoded for I set up a cut off point at 20, which means if a country contrib-
utes less than 20 personnels, it doesn’t count as a participation. Model 3 uses
the continuous variable (i.e. troop number) as the dependent variable. In
both models, the influence of the trade potential are statistically significant
at 1% level (Table 3).
Table 3. Trade potential’s influence on peacekeeping participation and contribution.
Model 2 Model 3
binary DV (recoded) continuous DV
Trade potential 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
Capital distance −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Security alliance 0.28 0.04
(0.17) (0.05)
Colonial ties 1.67∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.21)
Democratic country (Polity2) 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)
Refugee flows −0.00 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Conflict Intensity 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
PKO mandate 0.98∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.03)
Border (dummy) −1.21∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.05)
Number of co-current missions 0.50∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)








Num. obs. 14,892 14,892
R2 0.16
Adj. R2 0.16
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05, standard errors are clustered in a dyadic fashion.
93Uzonyi, “Refugee Flows.”
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6.2. Comparison Between Predicted Trade and Actual Trade
Some may argue that trade potential could have a reversed causality for
peacekeeping contribution. The presence of the peacekeeping may secure
the stability and then increase the trade volume. Therefore, in this part, I
take a step back and dissect trade potential into two parts: predicted trade
volume and actual trade volume. The actual trade volume may have a
reserve casual relationship with the UN peacekeeping participation, but
the predicted trade volume does not. The data of the predicted trade
volume is generated by the gravity model. Also, to be consistent with the
empirical result, the negative values of predicted trade volumes are coded
as zero. Also, this is an opportunity to compare the influence of the actual
trade and the predicted trade. According to the regression table, Model 4
presents the result that predicted trade volume still holds (Table 4).
Table 4. Robustness check.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
binary DV binary DV (recoded) continuous DV
Actual trade (log) 0.01 0.08 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
Predicted trade (log) 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
Capital distance −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Security alliance −0.57∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.11
(0.13) (0.17) (0.06)
Colonial ties 0.11 1.02∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.26) (0.21)
Democratic country (Polity2) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Refugee flows −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conflict Intensity −0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PKO mandate 1.17∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
Border (dummy) −1.27∗∗∗ −1.77∗∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.27) (0.06)
Number of co-current missions 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Financial reimbursement −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −2.48∗∗∗ −3.95∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.02)
AIC 12, 757.17 6517.88
BIC 12,856.08 6616.79
Log Likelihood −6365.59 −3245.94
Deviance 12, 731.17 6491.88
Num. obs. 14, 892 14, 892 14, 892
R2 0.17
Adj. R2 0.17
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05 standard errors are clustered in a dyadic fashion.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, I identify the puzzle of mixed result in trade’s influence on
peacekeeping contribution. Then, I argue that trade potential rather than
trade should be a better indicator to show peacekeeping contributors’ inter-
est in host countries. I argue that the lobby groups can regard elasticity of
demand and supply, asset specificity or factor mobility to pressure the gov-
ernment to send peacekeepers. By using gravity model to calculate the pre-
dicted trade volume and to get the value of trade potential, I run a logit
regression on peacekeeping participation. The result shows that trade poten-
tial is a good indicator. For a robustness check, I use both predicted trade
volume and actual trade volume to show that the result still holds.
In using a quantitative method to examine trade potentials’ influence on
peacekeeping contribution, I contribute the peacekeeping studies in several
ways. Firstly, I probe the puzzle of mixed result of trade’s influence on peace-
keeping contribution. I provide the empirical evidence that trade potentials
influence on peacekeeping contribution. Secondly, I use a new concept of
trade potential in conflict studies and try to combine trade potential concept
from economic integration literature with peacekeeping studies. Trade poten-
tial can be an important indicator in many other conflict studies. Thirdly, I use
a two-step research design. In the first step, I use gravity model in a sub-sample
method to calculate the predicted trade and then get the trade potential. In the
second step, I run the main model to get the result.
Some scholars94 question the empirical workhouse of gravity model and
use latent space model to modify it. The future research can carry on this
issue. However, The results presented here are supportive of the hypoth-
esized linkage between trade potential and UN peacekeeping contributions.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Step One Result
Appendix 1 part shows alternative models’ specification result in step one.
A.1. Alternative Model Specification with OLS Estimator
A.2. Theil’s U Table
This section presents all Theil’s U value results calculated in step one.
Table A1. Alternative model specification with OLS estimator.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Pool Random FE with ccode1 FE with ccode2 FE with year
(Intercept) −0.59∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Pool Random FE with ccode1 FE with ccode2 FE with year
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDPcountry1 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDPcountry2 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
populationcountry1 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
populationcountry2 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
distance −0.11∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.96
Adj. R2 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.96
Num. obs. 376, 268 376, 268 376, 268 376, 268 376, 268
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
Theil’s U value table (sub-sample OLS)
Models (All with LDV) Theil’s U Choose? observations
FE with importer2 (ccode2) dummy 0.9440105 376,268
FE with importer1 (ccode1) dummy 0.9498293 376,268
FE with year dummy 0.9486414 376,268
Pooled 0.9564451 376,268
RE 0.9568447 376,268
FE with dyad 0.8712868 smallest 376,268
Appendix 2. Alternative Estimation Method in Step1 with its Step2
Result
A.3. Gravity Model with Three Extra Variables
Here, I only show the result with year fixed effect as it takes a week of High Perform-
ance computer to calculate the main result with dyad fixed effect in the text.
A.4. PPML Estimator
Appendix 3. Main Model without Control
Appendix 4. Further Explanation on Robustness Check


























Num. obs. 376, 268
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
Table A3. Step2 result with the gravity model with three extra variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
binary DV binary DV (recoded) continuous DV
Trade potential 0.12∗∗∗ 0.03 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Capital distance −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Security alliance −0.29∗ 0.28 0.04
(0.12) (0.17) (0.05)
Colonial ties 0.73∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.25) (0.21)
Democratic country (Polity2) 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Refugee flows −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conflict Intensity −0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PKO mandate 0.93∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
Border (dummy) −0.84∗∗∗ −1.21∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.27) (0.05)
Number of co-current missions 0.56∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Financial reimbursement −0.00 −0.00∗ −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −1.99∗∗∗ −3.24∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.02)
AIC 13, 067.63 6729.67 13, 158.936820.97
Log Likelihood −6521.82 −3352.83 13, 043.636705.67
Num. obs. 14, 892 14, 892 14, 892
R2 0.16
Adj. R2 0.16
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
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Deviance 10, 987, 974.03
Num. obs. 389, 648
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
Table A5. Step2 result with PPML’s step1 result.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
binary DV binary DV (recoded) continuous DV
Trade potential 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Capital distance −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Security alliance −0.34∗∗ 0.29 0.03
(0.12) (0.15) (0.05)
Colonial ties 0.70∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.24) (0.20)
Democratic country (Polity2) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Refugee flows −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conflict Intensity −0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PKO mandate 1.04∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
Border (dummy) −0.83∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.24) (0.05)
Number of co-current missions 0.55∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Financial reimbursement −0.00∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −2.02∗∗∗ −3.30∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.02)
AIC 14, 505.05 7419.73
BIC 14, 597.47 7512.15
Log Likelihood −7240.53 −3697.87
Deviance 14, 481.05 7395.73
Num. obs. 16, 338 16, 338 16, 338
R2 0.17
Adj. R2 0.17
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
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Table A6. Models without control variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) −1.58∗∗∗ −2.77∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00)
Trade Potential 0.25∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
AIC 19, 502.00 9710.57
BIC 19, 517.82 9726.39
Log Likelihood −9749.00 −4853.29
Deviance 19, 498.00 9706.57
Num. obs. 20, 113 20, 113 20, 113
R2 0.01
Adj. R2 0.01
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05.
Table A7. Regression with only predicted trade or actual trade.
Model 1 Model 2
Predicted trade (log) 0.26∗∗∗
(0.01)
Actual trade (log) 0.22∗∗∗
(0.01)
Capital distance −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Security alliance −0.57∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13)
Colonial ties 0.11 0.16
(0.22) (0.22)
Democratic country (Polity2) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Refugee flows −0.00∗ −0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Conflict Intensity −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Border (dummy) −1.27∗∗∗ −1.23∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18)
Number of co-current missions 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)




AIC 12, 755.22 12, 794.67
BIC 12, 846.52 12, 885.97
Log Likelihood −6365.61 −6385.33
Deviance 12, 731.22 12, 770.67
Num. obs. 14, 892 14, 892
Note: ∗∗∗p , .001; ∗∗p , .01; ∗p , .05 standard errors are clustered in a dyadic fashion.
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